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COMMENTS
LABOR LAW: UNION FINING AS AN UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE UNDER SECTION 8 (b) (1) (A)
Courts recently have utilized section 8(bXl)(A) to strike at the
traditional power of a labor union to fine its members, holding
that certain fines impinge on rights guaranteed by the Taft-Hart-
ley Act. This comment examines the problems involved in de-
termining which fines are unfair labor practices and attempts to
show how a section 8(bXl)(A) remedy can be effectively integrated
with previous state and federal regulation of internal union affairs.
LABOR UNIONS have traditionally exercised great powers of dis-
cipline over their members,' with the two major disciplinary devices
I The extent of union discipline may be shown by a study of union constitutions
and bylaws. Two major sources are: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATSTIcs, DEP'T OF
LABOR, BULL. No. 1350, DISCIPLINARY POWERS AND PROCEDURES IN UNION CONSTI-
TUTrIONs (1963) [hereinafter cited as Dep't Labor Bull. No. 1350] which studied
158 union constitutions; and Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. &
LAB. R L. REv. 483 (1950), a study of 154 international unions. Although both
of these works are primarily concerned with the procedural aspects of union
discipline, they point out that unions have rules governing a wide variety
of member activities. Examples of specific offenses for which discipline is im-
posed include: (1) Work-connected offenses: 59 unions prohibit working on a job
while a strike is in progress and 31 punish work stoppages in violation of a con-
tractual agreement. Id. at 509. Other offenses vary with the union; for example, the
Garment Workers Union imposes fines on members who drop garment labels on the
floor. Dep't Labor Bull. No. 1350, at 28. (2) Union loyalty offenses: 69 unions
discipline members for supporting rival organizations. Summers, supra at 509. 64
unions discipline a member for failing to exhaust internal union remedies before
seeking outside assistance. Dep't Labor Bull. No. 1350, at 28. (3) Financial offenses:
"Any officer found guilty of accepting any bribe or present from any corporation,
contractor or association shall be fined . . . suspended . . . or expelled." Id. at 29.
(4) Personal morals offenses: members of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen Union
may be fined or expelled for "'immoral practices, wife abandonment, or improper
treatment of family.'" Summers, supra at 492. (5) Political activity offenses: "When
such [legislative] policy has been declared, no member of the Brotherhood shall appear
before any legislative committee, legislature, State, provincial, or Federal executive,
or take any action . . . in opposition to such a program in any capacity except that
of a private citizen; nor shall he, in the name of the Brotherhood, engage in any
political campaign for a candidate for public office after such candidate has been
endorsed by the Brotherhood." Dep't Labor Bull. No. 1350, at 33. Cf. De Mille v.
American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 175 P.2d 851 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946), aff'd, 31
Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948) (union's right to
fine member for refusal to pay assessment earmarked for use in opposing anti-labor
legislation upheld). (6) Miscellaneous offenses: The Carpenter Union's constitution
authorized fines for members who refuse to parade on Labor Day. Dep't Labor Bull.
No. 1350, at 27.
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being expulsion and fining. Initial judicial attempts to regulate
union discipline placed restraints on expulsion 2 but imposed few
limitations on union fining power. However, the growth of unions
and their increased reliance on the fining device 3 has led to a con-
temporary awareness of the need to regulate fining as well. 4 Thus,
as a reflection of this dawning cognizance, fining has recently come
under attack as being, in certain instances, an unfair labor practice
under section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act.5 This comment
will trace the development of section 8 (b) (1) (A) as it was expanded
to meet the problem of union fining and will then attempt to il-
lustrate how specific factors in each case may be determinative of
whether a particular fine should be an unfair labor practice.
APPLICATION OF SECTION 8 (b) (1) (A) TO UNION FINING
In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act amended section 7 of the existing
Wagner Act0 to include a provision giving employees the right to
refrain from union activities.7  Section 8, which had previously
2The limitations on expulsion were primarily imposed within the context of
closed shop unionism, where expulsion meant the loss of a job. See Chafee, The
Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. REv. 993, 1014-20 (1930).
This classic presentation indicates that at the time of the writing (1930) there were
three tests which the courts used to determine whether union discipline was lawful:
"(1) That rules and proceedings must not be contrary to natural justice; (2) The
expulsion must be in accordance with the rules; (3) The proceedings must have
been free from malice (bad faith)." Id. at 1014. (Emphasis added.) See generally
Aaron & Komoraff, Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs, 44 ILL. L. Rxv.
425, 631 (1949); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. Ruv.
1049 (1951); Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Action of Private As-
sociations, 76 HARV. L. Rv. 983 (1963).
3 See Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 483, 487
(1950). Fining is generally considered by unions as being superior to expulsion as a
means of discipline, for if a large number of members were expelled they could be-
come threats to union standards by cutting union rates or assuming the role of
strikebreakers. Fining also strengthens the union financially and affords a means for
the transgressing worker to repent. Ibid.
' See Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act)
§ 101 (a) (5), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (5) (1964) (procedural restrictions
put on union fining); S. 3081, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (introduced to amend
the Taft-Hartley Act in order to restrict union rules relating to the imposition of sanc-
tions for exceeding production quotas); H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8 (c) (5),
7 (b), 8(c) (1) (1947) (unenacted Taft-Hartley provisions regulating fining discussed);
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2066-69 (1947) (letters concerning fining abuses inserted by Senator Ball).
r Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1) (A)
(1964).
6 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
7 Section 7 presently provides that "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
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limited employer restraints of employee organizational rights," was
also amended by the addition of section 8 (b) (1) (A). That section
declares that union restraint or coercion which impinges on the
newly created section 7 right to refrain from union endeavors
constitutes an unfair labor practice.9 However, the protection ex-
tended by section 8 (b) (1) (A) is limited by a proviso which states
that a labor union could prescribe its own rules with respect to the
acquisition and retention of membership.10
Initially, section 8 (b) (1) (A) actions were limited to cases where
an employee's section 7 rights had been denied by means of physical
violence, intimidation and economic reprisal in the form of mass
picketing or job discrimination effected by union coercion." The
courts conceived the thrust of section 8 (b) (1) (A) to be a proscrip-
tion of such violent methods and blatant job discriminations,12 and
union fining thus remained unregulated so long as it accorded with
the union's own bylaws and constitution."
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and .shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(aX3)." National
Labor Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1964) (the italicized words represent the amendment).
8 Section 8 (a) (1) presently provides as follows: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer-(i) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158 (a) (1) (1964).
O Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides that "(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to
the acquisition or retention of membership therein." 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §
158 (b) (1) (A) (1964).
20 Ibid.
21 See, e.g., Local 294, Teamsters Unibn, 116 N.L.R.B. 842 (1956) (violence); In-
ternational Woodworkers, 116 N.L.R.B. 507 (1956), enforced, 243 F.2d 745 (5th Cir.
1957) (threats of violence); Local 140, United Furniture Workers, 113 N.L.R.B. 815
(1955), enforced, 233 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1956) (mass picketing); New Jersey Bell Tel.
Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1322 (1953), enforced sub nom. Communication Workers v. NLRB,
215 F.2d 835 (2d Cir. 1954) (economic reprisal). See generally GREGORY, LABoR AND
Trm LAW 557 (2d rev. ed. Supp. 1961).12 See, e.g., Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948); National Maritime Union,
78 N.L.R.B. 971, 986 (1948), enforced, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 954 (1950) (means used is the essence of a section 8 (b) (1) (A) violation). "By
section 8 (b) (1) (A), Congress sought to fix the rules of the game, to insure that
strikes and other organizational activities of employees were conducted peacefully
by persuasion and propaganda and not by physical force, or threats of force, or of
economic reprisal. In that Section, Congress was aiming at means, not at ends."
Perry Norvell Co., supra at 239.
11 Cf. International Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 951, 957 (1949), enforced
in relevant part, 193 F.2d 782, 800 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952).
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In the 1954 case of Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.,14 the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board determined the applicability of sec-
tion 8 (b) (1) (A) to union fining for the first time. There, a union
member had not picketed during a strike. The union retaliated
by causing the employer temporarily to discharge the offender and
when he returned to work, the union dropped him to the bottom
of its seniority list and fined him 500 dollars.15 The member there-
after filed unfair labor charges against the employer and the union
and the Board found that both the discharge and the loss of
seniority were unfair labor practices. However, it was held that the
fine was not an unfair labor practice because it was in accord with a
union bylaw.'8 Thus, the section 8 (b) (1) (A) proviso sanctioning
union membership rules was deemed applicable and was construed
to preclude any "interference with the internal affairs of a labor
organization."17
For the next decade, the Board rendered no decisions on the
question of the applicability of section 8 (b) (1) (A) to union fines.
However, the General Counsel, relying on Minneapolis Star, re-
peatedly ruled that fines in accord with union bylaws were internal
affairs and outside the purview of the Taft-Hartley Act.'8 During
this period, union members who felt that they had been disciplined
unjustly had to resort to state and federal district courts for relief
under other protective doctrines.'9
"[B]y including this proviso Congress unmistakeably [sic] intended to, and did, remove
the application of union's membership rules to its members from the proscriptions of
section 8 (b) (1) (A) irrespective of any ulterior reasons motivating the union's appli-
cation of such rules or the direct effect thereof on particular employees." 86 N.L.R-B.
at 957. (Emphasis added.)
1109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954).
' Id. at 737.
"' The bylaw related to the trial and fining of members who were guilty of gross
disobedience. Id. at 738.
2ld. at 729. The Trial Examiner's report included an examination of the con-
gressional history of the Taft-Hartley Act and concluded that "congressional recog-
nition of a labor organization's right to make its own rules presumes, of course,
its right to invoke them-except where the implementing of such rules is expressly pro-
hibited .... " Id. at 738.
1 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. Gen. Counsel Adm. Ruling, Case No. F-862, 44 L.R.R.M. 1113
(1959) (union fine for refusing to obey union leaders upheld through the 8 (b) (1) (A)
proviso); N.LR.B. Gen. Counsel Adm. Ruling, Case No. M-45, 39 L.R.R.M. 1307
(1957) (fine for filing an unfair labor charge is not an unfair labor practice under
section 8 (b) (1) (A)); N.L.R.B. Gen. Counsel Adm. Ruling, Case No. K-103, 37 L.LR.M.
1103 (1955) (union fine for filing charges without first exhausting internal remedies
is protected by 8 (b) (1) (A) proviso).1
' See, e.g., McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen, 341 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1965)
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In 1959, as a result of the findings of the McClellan Committee,20
Congress passed the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act (Landrum-Griffin)21 which placed certain union internal prac-
tices under close scrutiny and established an extensive regulatory
scheme designed to insure union democracy. Title I of the act
guaranteed labor union members freedom of speech and assembly,
2 2
the right to institute suit against and appear as witnesses against a
union, and the right to petition the legislature concerning labor ac-
tivities.m Title I also required the union to observe certain proce-
dures before a member could be disciplined.2 Initial proposals
would have provided for enforcement of these provisions by the
(member fined for going to the Board with a grievance found relief in the federal
courts under Landrum-Griffin provisions). The state courts also built up expertise in
certain areas. See, e.g., Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d
73 (1958) (member's right to engage in union political activities could not be im-
paired by union discipline). See generally Summers, The Law of Union Discipline:
What the Courts do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 (1960).
'0 See Murphy, The Background of the Bill of Rights and its Provisions in Sym-
POSIUM ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DxscLOsuE Acr OF 1959 277
(Slovenko ed. 1961); Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 851, 1086 (1960); Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill
of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REv. 199 (1960).
2173 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964).
22 Section 101 (a) (2) provides: "Every member of any labor organization shall have
the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any
views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization
his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any
business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and
reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein
shal be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce
reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization
as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its
performance of its legal or contractual obligations." 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 411 (a) (2) (1964).
13 Section 101 (a) (4) provides: "No labor organization shall limit the right of any
member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any
administrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its
officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the
right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness in any judicial,
administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to com-
municate with any legislator: Provided, That any such member may be required to
exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of
time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings
against such organizations or any officer thereof . 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§ 411 (a) (4) (1964).
2 4 Section 101 (a) (5) provides: "No member of any labor organization may be
fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues
by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A)
served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his de-




NLRB25 but the final enactment divided enforcement between the
Secretary of Labor 26 and the federal district courts.27
25 The initial plan had been to integrate the regulation of internal union affairs
into the Taft-Hartley Act. See Rothman, supra note 20, at 201-05 (history of ACLU
attempts to achieve a statutory enactment of a bill of rights for union members).
The original House version, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. (1947), of the Taft-
Hartley Act had in fact provided similar limitations on unions.
Proposed section 8 (c) (5) made it an unfair labor practice for an organization to
"fine or discriminate against any member, or subject him to any discipline or penalty,
on account of his having criticized, complained of, or made charges or instituted
proceedings against, the organization or any of its officers, or on account of his having
supported or failed to support any candidate for civil office or for any office in the
labor organization, or on account of his having supported or failed to support any
proposition submitted to the labor organization, or to citizens generally for a vote."
1 LEGISLATivE HisTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Aar, 1947, at 53-54 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as 1 LEG. Hisr. LMRA].
Proposed section 7 (b) further provided that "members of any labor organization
shall have the right to be free from unreasonable or discriminatory financial de-
mands of such organization, to freely express their view either within or without
the organization on any subject matter without being subject to disciplinary action
by the organization, and to have the affairs of the organization conducted in a man-
ner that is fair to its members and in conformity with the free will of a majority
of the members." I LEG. Hisr. LMRA 49-50.
Finally, proposed section 8(c)(1) provided that it should be an "unfair labor
practice to interfere with, restrain, or coerce individuals in the exercise of rights
guaranteed in section 7 (b) .... " I LEG. HIsT. LMRA 52, 53.
Why these provisions were dropped from the final version of the Taft-Hartley
Act is not adequately disclosed in the legislative history, but there is an indication
that § 9 (f) (6) (e), which required unions to make a statement of the provisions of their
constitutions and bylaws in reference to the imposition of fines, was passed to elim-
inate the need for the proposed additions outlined above. 1 LEG. HiST. LMRA 550.
Ironically, § 9 () (6) was the antecedent to the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act and was repealed by §§ 201 (d) and (e) of that act.
In Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965), the court took another view,
asserting that "the legislators may have thought that the proposal [8(c)(5)] was
worded too broadly and abandoned for that reason. Moreover, the legislators may
have decided it was unnecessary to make specific that it [fining] might be an unfair
labor practice under section 8 (b) (1) .... " Id. at 428 n.l.
go Section 304 (a) of the Landrum-Griffin Act provides as follows: "Upon the written'
complaint of any member or subordinate body of a labor organization alleging that
such organization has violated the provisions of this title [reports of trusteeship]
*(except section 301) the Secretary [of Labor] shall investigate the complaint and if
the Secretary finds probable cause to believe that such violation has occurred and
has not been remedied he shall, without disclosing the identity of the complainant,
bring a civil action in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of
the labor organization for such relief (including injunction) as may be appropriate.
Any member or subordinate body of a labor organization affected by any violation
of this title (except section 301) may bring a civil action in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the labor organization for such relief (including
injunctions) as may be appropriate." 73 Stat. 531 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 464 (a) (1964).
" Section 102 of the Landrum-Griffin Act provides that "any person whose rights
secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation
of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States
for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate." 73 Stat. 523 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964). This enforcement section has precipitated much of the
criticism concerning the Landrum-Griffin Act. The civil remedy afforded has been
[Vol. 1966: 717
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Perhaps influenced by the congressional concern for member
rights manifested by the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act, the
Board and the courts greatly expanded the scope of section
8 (b) (1) (A) to include within its proscriptions union activities which
were non-violent in character.28 In 1961, in International Ladies'
Garment Workers Union v. NLRB,2 9 the Supreme Court seemed to
sanction this expansion in cases involving nonviolent union ac-
tivity,30 stating in broad language that Congress, by the passage
of section 8 (b) (1) (A), had intended to impose upon unions the
same restrictions which the Wagner Act had imposed upon em-
ployers with respect to employee rights. 31
Another decision of great import in the expansion of section
8 (b) (1) (A) occurred in 1961 with the Seventh Circuit decision in
Allen Bradley Co. v. NLRB.32 In that case the protective scope
of the proviso sanctioning union membership rules was severely
limited.33 Whereas all union rules and bylaws had previously been
termed "illusory" and a myth because the plaintiff must provide his own counsel
and, moreover, legal costs are not recoverable. Thus, it is argued that few union
members can effectively utilize this provision. Klein, Internal Relations-UAW Public
Review Board Report, 18 RuTraFs L. REv. 304, 341 (1964).
23See, e.g., Rubber Workers Union (Business League of Gadsden), 150 N.L.R.B.
No. 18, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964) (unfair labor practice for union to refuse to process
grievance because of race); UMW, 143 N.L.R.B. 795 (1963) (unfair labor practice
for union to advise employee to quit because others would not work with him);
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d
Cir. 1963) (unfair labor practice for union not to represent employee); Perry Coal
Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1256 (1959), enforced as modified, 284 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1960),
modification denied, 291 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied sub nom. UMW v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 949 (1961) (unfair labor practice to send letter to employees stating
that union membership was a condition of employment).
"366 U.S. 731 (1960).
30 The court held that a minority union had violated § 8 (b) (1) (A) by attempting
to act as exclusive bargaining authority. Id. at 738.
"Ibid. In 1960, just one year prior to the International Ladies Garment Workers
decision, the Supreme Court had apparently acquiesced to a limited application of §
8 (b) (1) (A). See NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960), where the Supreme Court
held that peaceful picketing by a minority union was not an unfair labor practice.
The Court stated that "§ 8 (b) (1) (A) is a grant of power to the Board limited to
authority to proceed against union tactics involving violence, intimidation, and re-
prisal or threats thereof-conduct involving more than the general pressures upon
persons employed by the affected employers implicit in economic strikes." Id. at 290.
32 286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961), enforcement denied, 127 N.L.R.B. 44 (1960). The
Board has not acquiesced in the Seventh Circuit's reversal. Local 283, UAW, 145
N.L.R.B. 1097, 1102 (1964), hearing granted sub nom. Scofield v. NLRB, 50 CCH
Lab. Cas. 32595 (7th Cir. 1964), revd and remanded sub nom. UAW v. Scofield,
382 U.S. 205 (1965).
"1 The Allen Bradley litigation began when 14 employees worked during a strike
and were fined $100 each. Initially they filed 8 (b) (1) (A) charges with the NLRB.
286 F.2d at 443. However, these charges were dismissed by the General Counsel.
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treated as if they related to the acquisition and retention of mem-
bership,8 4 the Seventh Circuit now held that only those rules which
directly related to the acquisition and retention of membership
were internal affairs. The court held that rules and bylaws which at-
tempted to "deprive a member of his right to work and his employer
of the benefit of his services"35 were not internal affairs but legiti-
mate objects for collective bargaining and thus subject to provisions
of the Taft-Hartley Act.3 6
Within this evolutionary milieu the NLRB, beginning in 1964,
has again been faced with the problem of determining the ap-
plicability of section 8 (b) (1) (A) to union fining. At present, de-
cisions have been rendered in only a few distinct factual areas. How-
ever, they indicate a deep split between the Board and the reviewing
circuits as to the permissible scope of the application of section
8 (b) (1) (A) to the area of union fining. These decisions will be
reviewed below.
a) Fines for exceeding production quotas
In Local 283, UAW (Wisconsin Motor Co.),37 members of an
agency shop violated a union rule which limited the amount of
incentive pay which a worker could earn. The union instituted
suit to collect fines of fifty to one hundred dollars imposed on memr-
Twelve employees then petitioned the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board to
enjoin collection of the fines. Ibid. The lower court granted the injunction but the
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed in Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Lodge
78, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 11 Wis. 2d 292, 105 N.W.2d 278 (1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 878 (1961). The remaining two employees unsuccessfully filed suit in a
District of Columbia federal court to compel the General Counsel to issue the com-
plaint. Bandlow v. Rotham, 278 F.2d 866 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 909 (1960).
Allen Bradley, in an effort to prevent recurrence of such union fining, attempted to
insert a provision in a 1959 collective bargaining agreement which would have denied
the union the right to fine. 286 F.2d at 443-44. When the union refused, stating
union fining was an internal rule and not subject to collective bargaining, the com-
pany refused to continue contract talks. Id. at 444. The Board in Allen Bradley
Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 44 (1960), held this to be an unfair labor practice by the company
under section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (5), but was reversed by the Seventh Circuit. 286
F.2d 442 (1961).
3
, See notes 12, 14 and 15 supra and accompanying text.
35 286 F.2d at 446.
30 See § 8 (d) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1964),
which provides that management has the right to bargain collectively with the unions
concerning terms and conditions of employment.
1145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), hearing granted sub nom. Scofield v. NLRB, 50 CCH
Lab. Cas. 32595 (7th Cir. 1964), revd and remanded sub nom. UAW v. Scofield, 382
U.S. 205 (1965). The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's refusal to allow the
union to intervene in the review proceeding.
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bers who failed to adhere to this production quota. The Board
held that section 8 (b) (1) (A) was not intended to proscribe economic
pressures such as fining38 and, moreover, even if section 8 (b) (1) (A)
did apply to such coercion, that section's membership rule proviso
protected the exertion of union discipline since it was in accord
with provisions of the union bylaws.39 One member, Leedom, vigor-
ously dissented and argued that under section 7 a member had the
right to refrain from union activity.40 Further, he asserted that the
fine was an unfair labor practice constituting a form of economic
coercion. 41 Leedom discarded the argument that the fine was pro-
tected by the proviso. Rather, he adopted the reasoning of Allen
Bradley42 and concluded that the bylaw was in effect an assailable
union attempt to control production and wages, subjects related
to employment and not directly to the acquisition and retention of
membership.43
A similar case, Bay Counties District Council of Carpenters,44 in-
volved union production quotas set in the construction industry.
When a few workers violated these rules, they were fined from eight
to fifty dollars. The union attempted to collect these fines by re-
fusing to credit money paid for union dues until the fines were
paid. The Board held, with Leedom again dissenting, that this
collection procedure was an unfair labor practice under section
8 (b) (1) (A).45 However, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case,46
31 145 N.L.R.B. at 1101. The Trial Examiner concluded that the fining imposed
was coercive but that it was not the kind of coercion with which § 8 (b) (1) (A) was
concerned. Id. at 1127.
30 Ibid.
10 Leedom contended that there must have been a section 7 right involved, for
otherwise the majority would not have had to discuss the proviso. Id. at 1107 n.23.
" Leedom interpreted the word "reprisal" used in NLRB v. Drivers Union, 362
U.S. 274 (1960), as meaning not only physical but economic reprisal and specifically
including financial exactions. 145 N.L.R.B. at 1107. He then went on to analogize
the economic pressure of a fine' to those pressures exerted by the threat of loss of
employment, the latter of which has long been recognized as economic intimidation.
Td. at 1107 n.24. See, e.g., Marlin Rockwell Corp., 114 N.L.R.B. 553, 562 (1955).
'" See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
"145 N.L.R.B. at 1109-12.
"145 N.L.R.B. 1775 (1964), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Associated Home Builders
of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965).
4Id. at 1776. The Trial Examiner had noted as a "dispositive factor that these
employees are covered by union shop contracts, compelling them to maintain member-
ship in Respondents, in the language of section 8 (a) (3) of the Act [Taft-Hartley],
'as a condition of employment.' Stated otherwise, they were vulnerable to discharge
if their dues payments were not made." Id. at 1778. The Trial Examiner had also
concluded that "a union rule forbidding members to produce or work beyond a
specified quota would not appear on its face to be a rule concerning the acquisition
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stating that the Board had erred in not determining whether the fine
itself was an unfair labor practice under section 8 (b) (1) (A).47 The
court also stated that it viewed the proviso to that section as inapplica-
ble because the fine had no direct relevance to the acquisition or re-
tention of membership; rather, they were characterized as rules relat-
ing to terms and conditions of employment.48 Thus, coupling the
correlative reasoning of Leedom's dissents and the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Bay Counties, the immunity of union fines for exceeding
production quotas has been considerably eroded.
b) Fines for filing charges with the NLRB without
first exhausting internal union remedies
In Local 138, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,49 a union member
had been fined two hundred dollars for filing an unfair labor prac-
tice charge with the NLRB. 0 The Trial Examiner concluded that
Skura, the union member, was fined as an act of "retaliation and
coercion" in order to discourage resort to the Board.r' The Board,
or retention of membership. . . . However, for the purposes of this decision, I shall
assume that this proviso is to be interpreted broadly, contrary to the customary
narrow construction of provisos, and that a rule of this nature may be stretched
to fall within the proviso." Id. at 1783. Needless to say, Commissioner Leedom dis-
sented for the reasons set forth in his Local 283, UAW dissent, notes 40-43 supra
and accompanying text. 145 N.L.R.B. at 1777.
"Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745
(9th Cir. 1965).
471d. at 747. The court noted that the Trial Examiner relied on Local 283, UAW,
but stated that "in our search for court authority upon this point we have found but
one case which would support the position taken by the Board in this case and in
Local 283 .... That case is . . . [American Newspapers Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB,
193 F.2d 782 (7th Cir. 1951)]. In view of the disposition which that court made
of the case in remanding it to the Board, it is not clear that what was there said was
other than dictum." Id. at 749-50.
48 Id. at 749. "The rules relating to the limitation of production are plainly rules
adopted for the purpose of establishing the terms and conditions of employment of
union members. The rule is not directed merely to the employees; it has a direct
impact upon the employer." Id. at 750. However, the court seemingly remanded on
the alternate ground that since union production quotas established terms and con-
ditions of employment, they were subjects of collective bargaining and the union
had therefore violated § 8 (b) (3), which makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse
to bargain collectively with an employer. Id. at 752.
4 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964). See Note, 65 COLUb,. L. Rzv. 1108 (1965), criticizing
the decision as being too restrictive of union discipline.
"0 148 N.L.R.B. at 680. The charge was later withdrawn when the Board's regional
director advised Skura that a complaint would not issue. Id. at 679.
5 Id. at 684 n.16. There is no provision of the Taft-Hartley Act which states
that filing charges or testifying before the Board may not be a proper pretext for
the imposition of union sanctions. This is to be contrasted with § 8 (a) (4), 0hich
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to discharge or otherwise discriminate
[Vol. 1966: 717
LABOR LAW
while not questioning this conclusion, 2 held that even if the fine
was based, as the union contended, upon Skura's failure to follow
a union bylaw which required exhaustion of intra-union remedies,5 3
it nevertheless violated section 8 (b) (1) (A) as being coercive of the
right to file charges guaranteed in section 7.54 The NLRB further
ruled that by adopting and attempting to enforce such a bylaw
against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this
Act." 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (4) (1964). An early attempt to provide
for similar limitations on unions is found in the original House version of the Taft-
Hartley Act, H.R. 3020, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. § 8(c)(5) (1947), but was not passed.
"However, the NLRB did note that "under the circumstances it was not un-
reasonable for the Trial Examiner to conclude that on the basis of the whole record
that it would have been futile for Skura to press his claim of discrimination within
the Union, and that the Union's internal procedures were neither clear nor adequate."
148 N.L.R.B. at 684 & n.16.
5'In 1961, sixty-four union constitutions contained provisions for the application
of sanctions in cases where a member failed to "exhaust" union remedies before seeking
outside assistance. Dep't Labor Bull. No. 1350, at 28.
Two "exhaustion" requirements are often confused: (1) The familiar provision in
union constitutions which forbids suit against the union under penalty of discipline
unless the member first requests redress through 'all union procedures, trials,
hearings, and appeals. Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 103-04 (U. of
Calif. Monograph Series 5, 1960). The policy behind this union rule is the tenet
that internal resolution of problems is necessary if the unions are to maintain a
united front in the struggle against management. (2) Another "exhaustion" theory,
distinct from the first, is the judicial doctrine that a court will not entertain a mem-
ber's action against a voluntary association until the member has "exhausted" all
reasonable remedies within the organization. Id. at 104. A basic policy underlying
this doctrine is that by having the unions manage their own "housekeeping," the
burden of litigation on the courts is lessened. See Montemuro, The Doctrine of Ex-
haustion of Union Remedies, 2 DuKE B.J. 148 (1952) (history of court exhaustion
rule); Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1086-92 (1951) (utilization of exhaustion requirement by state courts); Summers, The
Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 207-12 (1960)
(policies of and exceptions to the judicial exhaustion rule); Witmer, Civil Liberties
and the Trade Union, 50 YALE L.J. 621, 630 (1941) (approving wisdom of the judicial
exhaustion rule). See generally Developments in the Law-Judicial Control of Actions
of Private Associations, 76 HAxv. L. REV. 983, 1069-80 (1963); Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d
1099 (1963); Annot., 168 A.L.R. 1462 (1947).
5 148 N.L.R.B. at 681-82. Previously, the NLRB had protected access to the Board
when members were denied rights by means of violence, threats of violence, or eco-
nomic coercion in the form of job discrimination. See, e.g., Shipwrecking, Inc., 136
N.L.R.B. 1518-19, 1529 (1962) (threat of job discrimination); Bordas & Co., 125
N.L.R.B. 1335 (1959), enforced, 288 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (threats of expulsion
from union for filing charges); Local 450, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 122 N.L.R.B.
564, 567-68 (1958), enforced, 281 F.2d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 US.
909 (1961) (threats of expulsion and consequent loss of job in order to compel
withdrawal of charges); Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 116 N.L.R.B. 842, 844
(1956) (bribery to induce withdrawal of charges); International Ass'n of Bridge
Workers, 112 N.L.R.B. 1059, 1060 (1955) (threats of job discrimination in retaliation
for testifying); Textile Workers Union, 108 N.L.R.B. 743, 749 (1954), enforced, 227
F.2d 409, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. granted on other grounds, 350 U.S. 1004, cert.
denied on other grounds, 352 U.S. 864 (1956) (threats of physical violence and job
discrimination to compel members to stop testifying at Board hearings).
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restricting access to the Board, the union had ventured beyond the
province of internal rules and thus forfeited the protection of the
proviso. 5 The Board also found that section 101 (a) (4) of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,5 0 which guarantees
the right of any member to institute an action in any court or ad-
ministrative agency, established a federal policy that union rules
which deny access to these bodies are contrary to public policy and
void.57
Affirming the Board's ruling in a companion case, 8 the District
of Columbia Circuit held in Roberts v. NLRB, 9 that it was an un-
fair labor practice for a union to impose a 450 dollar fine against a
member because he had filed unfair labor practice charges with the
Board without first exhausting his internal union remedies. The
court discounted reliance on the proviso of 8 (b) (1) (A) because
the imposition of the fine was "too remote from a rule with respect
to the acquisition or retention of membership to be protected by the
55 148 N.L.R.B. at 682.
5673 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (4) (1964). See note 23 supra.
s 148 N.L.R.B. at 683. The Board pointed to Professor Cox's view as expounded
in Cox, LAW AND rTE NATIONAL LABOR PoLicY 103-04 (U. of Calif. Monograph
Series 5, 1960), that § 101 (a) (4) of the Landrum-Griffin Act "was plainly intended
to outlaw union rules disciplining members for bringing suit against the union,"
148 N.L.R.B. at 683, and that union rules which seek to compel exhaustion should
be void as against public policy. Cox, op. cit. supra at 103-04. "No private organi-
zation should be permitted to restrict any person's access to courts of justice. This
right should be as absolute as the right to appear in court as a witness, to petition a
legislature, or to communicate with a member of Congress." Id. at 104. Under this
thesis § 101 (b) and § 609 of the Landrum-Griffin Act should have applied. Section
101 (b) provides that "any provision of the constitution and bylaws of any labor
organization which is inconsistent with the provisions of this section shall be of no
force or effect." 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (b) (1964). This section thus
would give force to § 609, which provides that "it shall be unlawful for any labor
organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor
organization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline
any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the pro-
visions of this Act. The provisions of section 102 shall be applicable in the enforce-
ment of this section." 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1964). But see Witmer,
Civil Liberties and the Trade Union, 50 YALE L.J. 621, 630 (1941), where the author
states: "Freedom of litigation, for instance, is hardly so essential a part of the
democratic process that the courts should be asked to strike down all hinderances to
its pursuit." See O'Donoghue, Protection of a Union Member's Right to Sue Under
the Landrum-Griffin Act, 14 CATHoUc U.L. REv. 215, 222-23 (1965), a criticism of the
Board's action in the Skura case as being a flagrant disregard of the provision in
§ 101 (a) (4) requiring a four-month exhaustion period prior to resort to the courts.
58 H. B. Roberts, 148 N.L.R.B. 674 (1964), aff'd, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The Board report had simply stated that the case was governed by Local 138, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 148 N.L.R.B. 679 (1964), decided the same day. H. B.
Roberts, supra at 676.
" 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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mere language of the proviso." 60  The court discussed the ap-
plicability of section 101 (a) (4) of the Landrum-Griffin Act and
concluded that the provision for a four-month period during which a
member should make use of internal union procedures prior to
resort to the courts61 did not preclude the Board from acting
within that period if it so desired.62 Thus, the nascent case law in
00 Id. at 428 n.2.
01 It is not clear from the legislative history of § 101 (a) (4) who may restrict the
members from appealing outside the union for the four-month period prescribed by
law. O'Donoghue, supra note 57, at 223-34, concludes that § 101 (a) (4) was- under-
stood differently in the Senate and the House. The Senate viewed it as placing re-
strictions on the unions and not the courts, but the House came to the conclusion
that the rule restricted both courts and unions. Id. at 234. See 2 LEGISLATIVE HisroRy
OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DiscLOsuRE Aar OF 1959, at 1432 (1959)
(remarks of Senator Kennedy); id. at 1600-01 (remarks of Representative Foley); id.
at 1811 (remarks of Representative Griffin).
The congressional indecision as to which exhaustion policy, note 53 supra, was
imposed by § 101 (a) (4) is reflected in the decisions of the courts. The initial judicial
view was that Congress intended to allow unions to continue to require their members
to exhaust internal remedies if this exhaustion could be completed within a four-
month period. Conversely, unless the member had in fact exhausted his remedies
courts adopting this view were constrained to dismiss the suit as premature. Smith v.
General Truck Drivers Union, 181 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Cal. 1960), which, however, in-
volved an action begun prior to the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act. See also
Mamula v. United Steel Workers, 414 Pa. 294, 200 A.2d 306, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 17
(1964) (applying the rule that exhaustion of internal remedies is a condition precedent
to resort to state courts). Cf. Wirtz v. Local 125, Int'l Hod Carriers, 231 F. Supp. 590
(N.D. Ohio 1964) (exhaustion as a condition precedent applied to action by Secretary
of Labor). But see Note, 48 VA. L. REv. 78, 92-94 (1964) (criticizing this view).
A second view was that Congress had enacted the rule that unions could require
a four-month exhaustion period but by inserting the term "reasonable" in § 101 (a) (4),
the courts were left free to develop their own tests in determining whether relief
prior to the expiration of four months was appropriate. This view accorded with the
pre-1959 decisions of many state courts, which had formulated numerous exceptions
to the judicial practice of exhaustion. See Summers, The Law of Union Discipline:
What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 207-12 (1960). See, e.g., Detroy v.
American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929
(1961). The following have been held to constitute sufficient reasons for not re-
quiring exhaustion of union remedies prior to resort to the courts: (1) When the
remedial procedure of the union is uncertain and not specifically brought to the
attention of the aggrieved party and immediate injury which will be difficult to
compensate in money damages is likely. Detroy v. American Guild of Variety
Artists, supra at 81. (2) When the pursuit of a union's appeal procedures would
likely prove futile. Farowitz v. Associated Musicians, 330 F.2d 999, 1002-03 (2d Cir.
1964), enforced, 241 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). (3) When the appeal procedures
within the union are unreasonable under the circumstances. Sheridan v. United
Bhd. of Carpenters, 191 F. Supp. 347, 353 (D. Del. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 306
F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962). (4) When irreparable harm would result if immediate action is
not taken. Gartner v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 115, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1963); see Note, 16
HASTINcs L.J. 590, 594 (1965).
62 350 F.2d at 430. The statutory language of § 101 (a) (4), 73 Stat. 522 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 411 (a) (4) (see note 23 supra), by including the terminology "before insti-
tuting legal or administrative proceedings" would seem to indicate that Congress
intended to apply this provision to the Board. However, the remarks of Senator
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the area indicates that not only will the failure to exhaust internal
remedies be insufficient as a defense to unfair fining practices, but
also that the Board may in its discretion act upon such matters
before the expiration of the four-month intra-union period.
c) Fines for violations related to picket line activity
Local 248, UAW (Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.),0 3 involved fines rang-
ing from twenty to one hundred dollars imposed on union members
who crossed picket lines after a valid strike vote had been taken.
A majority of the Board held that such a fine was an internal affair
and therefore protected by the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A). 4 The
Seventh Circuit, in affirming the Board's decision,"' held that Con-
gress did not intend that section 7 should protect a member who
crossed a picket line from being fined when such a crossing was in
defiance of a valid decision by the union majority to strike.60 To
Kennedy, 2 LEGiSLATrvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND DISCLOSURE Aar oF
1959, at 1432 (1959), and Representative O'Hara, id. at 1632, indicate that the
§ 101 (a) (4) proviso was not to apply to the Board. But see id. at 1667 (remarks of
Representative McCormack). The Board itself was careful to state in Local 138, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs that even if the exhaustion requirement were to apply
to the Board, it would have been futile for Skura to have proceeded further. 148
N.L.R.B. at 684 n.16. The Board also noted that the union's internal procedures were
neither clear nor adequate, citing as authority Detroy v. American Guild of Variety
Artists, supra note 61. 148 N.L.R.B. at 684 n.16. See also Petitioner's Reply Brief,
pp. 2-4, Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
" 149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964), aff'd sub nom. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 60
L.R.R.M. 2097 (7th Cir. 1965), reu'd on rehearing, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
6, "Here too, the Respondents have properly maintained the distinction between
treatment of the individual as a member of the union and treatment of him as an
employee. They have imposed the fine only on their own members. It is not al-
leged that the Respondents ever attempted to affect the jobs or working conditions
of any of the fined individuals." 149 N.L.R.B. at 69.
Commissioner Leedom again dissented, stating that "I think it will come as a
surprise to the affected individual when he is told that a union fine designed to
induce him to respect picket lines and stay away from his job does not touch
him as an employee but only as a union member. One of the indispensable factors in
any employment relationship is the employee's willingness to come to work." Id.
at 73.
Leedom also asserted that "Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. . . . relied on by
the majority, is in my opinion of doubtful precedential value. . . . In that case the
Trial Examiner rather summarily rejected the General Counsel's contention that the
imposition of a fine violated Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and the Board was equally summary
in affirming him, citing only .. . [International Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B.
951 (1949)]. That cited case, however, despite some broad language dealt only with the
right of a union to threaten expulsion and was decided on the ground that in view
of the proviso such a threat could not be considered as 'coercion.'" Id. at 74 n.8.
65 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 60 L.R.R.M. 2097 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd on
rehearing, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
66160 L.R.R.M. at 2099.
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reach this decision, the court took note of the legislative history of
the Taft-Hartley Act and analogized the worker's defiant conduct
to wildcat strikes which were expressly denied protection under
section 7 .7 On rehearing, however, the Seventh Circuit sitting en
banc reversed.68 A four-judge majority based their decision on a
literal reading of sections 7 and 8 (b) (1) (A), reasoning that a fine
was a species of economic reprisal clearly prohibited by section
8 (b) (1) (A).69 Similarly, the majority limited the protection of the
8 (b) (1) (A) proviso to bylaws concerning gaining and expelling of
members; a rigidly literal interpretation of the requirement of
"rules with respect to the acquisition and retention of member-
ship." 70 The three dissenting judges spoke in equally sweeping,
albeit converse, terms. Section 7 rights, they argued, should be lim-
ited to employees who were not members of unions; when employees
join unions for collective bargaining purposes, they forego the right
to belong to labor organizations on their own terms.7 1
The Allis-Chalmers decision indicates the extent to which the
courts have departed from the permissive deference formerly ac-
corded matters of "internal union affairs." Fining has become a
recognized instrument of coercion in derogation of the individual
rights accorded union members, and the courts appear quite willing
to discard the talisman of internal affairs in order to ensure those
statutory guarantees. The NLRB, however, has indicated greater
' Id. at 2099-2101. The court also alluded to policy justifications for its decision,
reasoning that § 101 (a) (2) of the Landrum-Griffin Act "clearly protects the rights of
a union reasonably to discipline members who violate contract clauses." Id. at 2100-01.
See also Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 H-Lv. L. REv. 1049,
1078 (1951). But cf. NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1953) (em-
ployee has a § 7 right to refrain from striking); Clara-Val Packing Co., 87 N.L.R.B.
703, 704 (1949) (unfair labor practice to induce employer discrimination in order to
punish workers who crossed picket lines); International Long Shoremen, 79 N.L.R.B.
1487 (1948) (unfair labor practice to use violence to coerce employees into not crossing
picket lines).
"8 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
69 Id. at 2500. "The statutes in question present no ambiguities whatsoever, and
therefore do not require recourse to legislative history for clarification." Ibid. The
dissenters pointed out that the Supreme Court never rendered such a literal reading
of § 8 (b) (1) (A), citing NLRB v. Drivers Union, 862 U.S. 274 (1960), where the Su-
preme Court had found it necessary to examine the legislative history of § 8 (b) (1) (A)
in some detail to determine the issue of whether "peaceful picketing" by a union
was an unfair labor practice. 358 F.2d at 667.
'0 Id. at 660. The court noted that its original decision was in conflict with the
Seventh Circuit decision in Allen Bradley, see notes 32-86 supra and accompanying
text, and that the statement in Allen Bradley that union fines for crossing picket




reluctance to scrutinize fining procedures where the fine is not im-
posed to punish the filing of unfair labor practice charges against
the union.7
2
STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING IF A FINE IS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
The above decisions illustrate that union fines can be, in cer-
tain instances, unfair labor practices. The nonviolent nature of a
fine is no longer a sufficient imprimatur to support fining as a
legitimate means of union membership control; nor does the proviso
to section 8 (b) (1) (A) protect every fine from an unfair labor prac-
tice charge merely because provision is made for fining in union
constitutions and bylaws. In an attempt to afford some predict-
ability as to the future disposition of cases protesting fines, the
key decisional factors should be discerned and isolated. It is sub-
mitted that a close scrutiny reveals that certain considerations are
in most cases accorded significant weight by- the courts and the
Board in their determinations, although no one factor may be re-
garded as pivotal. Rather, the foregoing decisions indicate that
the entire factual spectrum will be given detailed examination
prefatory to a decision.
1) Uniform considerations
Any determination of the validity of a union fine must begin
with a consideration of whether the individual action which precipi-
tated the fine is protected by a provision or policy of the Taft-
Hartley Act. Thus, certain activities such as wildcat striking, al-
though arguably a type of conduct protected under section 7, are
so opposed to the national labor policy of maintaining industrial
peace that no protection is extended the member faced with a
union fine for such conduct.7 8 Conversely, individual activities such
72 The Board has implied that only when the union fine was imposed for filing
charges would there be an exception to the principle that union disciplinary action is
protected by the proviso to § 8 (b) (1) (A). Tawas Tube Prods. Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 9,
58 L.R.R.M. 1330 (1965). The decisions in Associated Home Builders of Greater
East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965), and Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966), indicate that the circuit courts consider the
exception much broader.
"' See House Committee Report on H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1947),
which stated: "The committee has revised this section by writing into it in express
terms that employees who strike or engage in similar activities in violation of collec-
tive bargaining agreements, or who engage in unfair labor practices under section 8,
or in concerted activities that are unlawful under section 12, forfeit the protection
of the Labor Act." 1 LEG. HisT. LMRA 318. Although H.R. 3020, § 12 was not en-
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as the right to file unfair labor practice charges not only constitute
a section 7 right but are positively encouraged 74 because without
freedom of administrative access, the Board would be hampered in
effectuating its protective mandate.75 Thus such activities have been
held to be completely outside the union's power to obstruct by
means of fining.76
Once it is determined that the fined activity is protected under
section 7, the issue facing the court is whether the fine is a form of
economic coercion used to curtail that protected activity in violation
of section 8 (b) (1) (A). Initially, the nonviolent aspect of the fine
was considered to preclude definitively its proscription. 77 When
section 8 (b) (1) (A) was judicially expanded to include nonviolent
activities, the inquiry was shifted to the application of the pro-
viso.78 In fact, however, the proviso does not specifically address
acted in the final version of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Conference Committee Report
stated that § 8 (b) (1) (A) was intended to cover the activities mentioned in proposed§ 12. 1 LEG. HLST. LMRA 546. See United Rubber Co., 21 War Lab. Rep. 182
(1945), where 700 members were fined for engaging in a wildcat strike. When 570
refused to pay, the National War Labor Board ordered the fines deducted from their
pay checks. Cf. Hatch v. Grand Lodge of R.R. Trainmen, 233 I1. App. 495 (1924)
(implies that disciplining wildcat strikers may not only be a power but a positive duty
of a union).
7, See, e.g., Local 238, Wood Lathers' Union, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 1172
(N.L.R.B. Jan. 18, 1966) (fine for filing unfair labor charges without first exhausting
union internal remedies was deemed violative of § 8 (b) (1) (A) even though the mem-
ber fined was neither employee nor applicant for employment of employer involved in
case); Local 1510, Milwrights & Machinery Erectors, 152 N.L.R.B. No. 132, 59 L.R.R.M.
1310 (1965) (remarks by union official implying imposition of fine if union member
brings charges to the Board is an unfair labor practice). See also Farmbest, Inc.,
154 N.L.R.B. No. 146, 60 L.R.R.M. 1159 (1965) (union violated § 8(b) (1) (A)
by merely questioning employee concerning content of testimony he expected to give
at a Board proceeding). But cf. Local 703, Int'1 Hod Carriers, 150 N.L.R.B. No. 155, 58
L.R.R.M. 1305 (1965) (mere existence of a provision for fining for resort to govern-
mental agency prior to exhaustion is not an unfair labor practice).
" In the field of discipline for filing decertification petitions, which also seem to
have been encouraged by the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board has been more hesitant
in providing protection. See, e.g., Local 4028, United Steelworkers, 154 N.L.R.B. No.
54, 60 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1965); Tawas Tube Prods., 151 N.L.R.B. No. 9, 58 L.R.R.M. 1330
(1965) (union suspensions for filing decertification petition held not an unfair labor
practice). But cf. Mid-States Metal Prods., Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 2 LAB.
Ra.. REP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 1159 (Jan. 17, 1966) (violence and coercion through em-
ployer discrimination as discipline for filing decertification petition is an unfair
labor practice).
10 It has been held that not only does the Board have authority to protect em-
ployees who use the Board's processes but that the Board has an affirmative duty to
protect such employees. Pedersen v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1956) (employer
discharged a worker for going to the Board).
7 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
7S See notes 35-36, 39, 43, 48, 55, 60, 70 supra and accompanying text.
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itself to the question of a union's discipline of its members.
Rather, it mentions only the union's right to determine its mem-
bership7 9 The courts80 and commentators8' initially filled this gap
by concluding that the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A) must have
been meant to exclude from NLRB scrutiny all union discipline
which accorded with a union constitution or bylaw. The trend of
the decisions has been to narrow the scope of the proviso's protec-
tion, however, and recent decisions have seemingly been resolved
by deciding how directly a particular rule relates to the statutory
language of acquisition and retention of membership. 82 Since the
criterion of "directness" is fraught with imprecision, the decisions
have in all probability turned on more specific factors.
2) Specific factors
(a) Contract theory and a member's obligation under
union bylaws
A court wishing to decide the validity of a fine may choose to
examine the bylaw sanctioning the fine in an attempt to determine
if it should bind the worker. Such an inquiry has often turned
on the threshold question of whether the worker contracted to be
bound by the rule at issue. This in turn involves a consideration
of the "contract theory" of membership rights and obligations.83
In the past, courts have sanctioned union discipline on the theory
that an individual who joined a union entered into a "voluntary
association" and contracted to abide by the association's rules and
bylaws.8 4 Today this contract theory is of limited utility in the case
70 The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that a narrower role was
foreseen for the proviso to § 8 (b) (1) (A). It was originally enacted to guarantee the
union's right to choose and expel its members without fear of an unfair labor practice
charge so long as that union decision did not result in a worker's being discharged.
2 LEo. HISr. LMRA 1141-42 (remarks of Senators Taft, Pepper and Ball). This
analysis of the proviso's function was apparently adopted by the Seventh Circuit in
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 2 LAB. RL. REP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 2498 (7th Cir.
March 11, 1966). See notes 68-70 supra.
:'See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
'See Sugarman, Rights of the Individual Employee Under the Taft-Hartley Act,
N.Y.U. 3D CONF. ON LABOR 355, 357-58 (1950).
"See notes 36, 43, 48, 55, 60, 70 supra and accompanying text.
"See Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 HARv. L. Rsv.
993, 1001-07 (1930), ridiculing as artificial the theory of a separate contract
for each member. But see Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts
Do in Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 179-84 (1960), criticizing the contract theory but noting
that it has been used by the courts to rationalize judicial interference to protect
members' "contract" rights.
" See, e.g., Local 283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1104-05 (1964) (concurring
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of a union shop since, unlike a contractual relationship, the union
can require prospective employees to join the association and re-
main members in good standing as a condition of employment.8 5
Such a context rebuts any presumption that a worker voluntarily
agreed to be bound by the union rules.86 The theory may have
some efficacy in an agency shop situation,8 7 however, since there
theoretically exists some freedom of choice in that any worker may
opinion), hearing granted sub nom. Scofield v. NLRB, 50 CCH Lab. Cas. 32595 (7th
Cir. 1964), rev'd and remanded sub nom. UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965); Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 2 LAB. Rni RFP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 2498, 2502 (7th Cir.
March 11, 1966) (dissenting opinions); cf. UAW v. Woychik, 5 Wis. 2d 528, 93 N.W.2d
336 (1958) (union constitutions and bylaws held to constitute a contract between
union and its members in suit for collection of union fine for crossing picket line).
See also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958). "This
contractual conception of the relation between a member and his union widely pre-
vails in this country .... ." Id. at 618.
8 A union shop is a union security agreement between labor and management
of a given plant by which employees need not be union members as a condition of
hiring but must join the union within a specified time, and remain members in good
standing during the period of the contract. The Taft-Hartley Act imposes limits upon
the use of the union shop in § 8 (a) (3), which provides in part that "no employer
shall justify any discrimination against an employee for nonmembership in a labor
organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership
was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally ap-
plicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a con-
dition of acquiring or retaining membership." 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3)
(1964).
86 The greater possibility of coercion under a union shop arrangement was recog-
nized in Bay Counties District Council of Carpenters, 145 N.L.R.B. 1775 (1964), rev'd
and remanded sub nor. Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB,
352 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1965), where the Trial Examiner at the Board level held that
where the issue was collection of a fine through the exaction of excess dues from mem-
ber paychecks, the fact that it was a union shop was a dispositive factor in determining
unfair coercion since nonpayment of dues could result in discharge. 145 N.L.R.B. at
1778. This approach was adopted by the Seventh Circuit on rehearing in Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 2 LAB. RmtL. REP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 2498 (7th Cir. March 11,
1966), the court holding that it was an unfair labor practice to fine union members
who crossed picket lines "where ... membership is the result not of individual volun-
tary choice but of the insertion of a union security provision in the contract under
which a substantial minority of the employees may have been forced into member-
ship." Id. at 2501. But see the dissent in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. supra, which indi-
cated that in fact the union shop in question did not require employees to become
members but only to pay dues and that here the complaining employees had volun-
tarily become members. Id. at 2508.8 7 An agency shop is an arrangement whereby employees pay "support" money to
the union for the costs of representation and contract administration but are not
required to maintain union membership. The practice was upheld as lawful under
the Taft-Hartley Act in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); cf.
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 37a U.S. 746, aff'd on rehearing, 375 U.S.




choose to merely pay support money rather than to join the union.
If a worker does join, the presumption of voluntariness would thus
be unrebutted.88 A similar argument as to voluntariness of a mem-
ber's bylaw obligations may be made in a state which has a right-to-
work law.89 Since there is no requirement that membership be
maintained, the worker can initially be presumed to have volun-
tarily joined a union. 0
It is evident from the foregoing that the contract theory is both
artificial and often remote from the realities of a compulsive union
shop. Although the invocation of this theory has precedential under-
pinnings, its vitality has been vitiated by a realization of these short-
comings. The courts have thus looked to other considerations as
determinative of a resolution of the validity of fining practices at
issue in recent cases, although a contractual inquiry may be posed
as a perfunctory initial question.
(b) Notice, procedural due process and exhaustion
In addition to whether a worker agreed to be bound by a
union's rules, the courts have taken note of how a rule was in fact
applied in each individual case. Initially, the question is one of fair
notice. The member may not have realized, or been able to ascer-
tain, that his act violated any union rule. At present, bylaws de-
lineating activities subject to fine are often worded in general terris
such as a fine for conduct unbecoming a union member.91 Such
8 It has been suggested that if the worker had been a member of a union
shop rather than an agency shop the unfair labor charge may have been sustained.
1964 DuKE L.J. 638, 642.
See also Allen Bradley Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961), where the fact
that the union in question had no maintenance of membership requirement (ap-
proximating an agency shop) was not held dispositive and union fining power was
limited. See notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text.
So Under § 14o(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164()
(1964), nineteen states have, as of 1966, passed laws which prohibit union security
agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment. These laws were upheld by the Supreme Court as constitutional in Lincoln
Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
90 See Brief for Petitioner, p. 18 n.10, Roberts v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir.
1965). It is thus arguable that in those states where union membership is not re-
quired by state law any worker who joins a union must have done so "voluntarily"
and thus should be bound by the union rules. However, this approach fails to con-
sider the possibility that, apart from state laws, certain jobs may still be performed
almost exclusively by union members. Thus, if a construction worker desires work
in a right-to-work state he must in some cases obtain it through a union.
"I For examples of such bylaws, see Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3
IND. & LAB. REL. Rav. 483, 493 n.28, 505-08 (1950).
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broad indictments scarcely afford adequate notice as to what con-
stitutes such conduct. Other bylaws may set forth the offense clearly
but delineate no standards for punishment.92 Since both omissions
open the door to arbitrary union action, a court could view either
as sufficiently infirm to justify a ruling that a fine in such a situa-
tion would be an unfair labor practice.
Even if the worker is sufficiently apprised of an offense and its
possible punishment, a court may decide that lack of procedural
due process within the union hearing apparatus could require a
finding of an unfair labor practice. In support of a requirement
that procedural due process be afforded, the courts and the Board
can draw support from procedural requirements set forth as an
expressed standard of national labor policy in section 101 (a) (5) of
the Landrum-Griffin Act. 93 Thus, it appears eminently proper to
require union fining procedure to meet the minimum standards
imposed by that section-service of specific charges, a reasonable time
to prepare a defense and a full and fair hearing.
In determining whether in fact a fair hearing was provided, a
court might also consider past indications of member-union fric-
tion. Thus, in Roberts v. NLRB 94 the fact that the fined member
had previously represented an opposition candidate in a union
election and had attempted to postpone Roberts' installation as
president may have influenced the court in concluding that it
would have been futile for the member to continue his union appeals
and that a fine for failing to continue to seek redress through intra-
union channels was an unfair labor practice.95
(c) The amount of the fine
The amount of the fine may also be influential in a judicial
decision as to its validity. The less the amount the more likely it
is that a court will either find that the fine is not "coercive" under
section 8 (b) (1) (A) or will characterize it as a permissible "internal
rule" falling within the proviso. Thus, a one dollar fine for missing
"As of 1961, 75 unions had no enforcement machinery for fine collection. Dep't
Labor Bull. No. 1350, at 12. This may indicate that implicit in the imposition of
fines is the existence of measures to compel compliance.
9373 Stat. 522 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a) (5) (1964). See note 24 supra.
"4 350 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
o The court explicitly limited its "approval of the Board's construction of its
powers to the case before us, where the fine was not imposed because of the member's
harassing conduct as a member ...." Id. at 430.
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a meeting is justifiable as promoting a legitimate union interest in
asserting its authority to promote internal discipline.98 However, a
500 dollar fine for the same offense would in all likelihood cause a
court to conclude that the union had coercively transgressed the
bounds of internal rules and committed an unfair labor practice.
A second consideration which may be implicitly relevant is whether
the amount of the fine is equated with the worker's ability to pay.
Thus, a 500 dollar fine might be acceptable if applied to an inter-
national union president whereas it would not be if it were applied
to a worker earning thirty-two dollars per week. 7
(d) Collection of the fine
It might also be relevant and instructive for the Board or re-
viewing court to consider whether the procedures for collection
might comprise an independent violation of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Prior to 1947, given a closed-shop situation, the normal method of
fining enforcement was by threatening expulsion from the union,
which would in turn mean loss of employment. With the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act, this enforcement method was foreclosed
by the virtual elimination of the closed shop. Section 8 (b) (2) pre-
cluded union collection of a fine through the conduit of causing
or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against an em-
ployee for failure to pay union obligations other than normal dues
and initiation fees.98 When the union attempted to utilize the device
of applying money paid for dues or initiation fees to fines, section
8 (b) (2) was also applied to preclude such collections as unfair
96Cf. De Mile v. American Fed'n of Radio Artists, 175 P.2d 851 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1946), aff'd, 31 Cal. 2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 876 (1948).
9T See McGinley v. Milk & Ice Cream Salesmen Union, 351 Pa. 47, 40 A.2d 16
(1945), where union members were fined $1000 for theft and forgery of cards sent
out to ascertain member preferences regarding an appointive office. The court
observed that the fine amounted to expulsion, since the average earnings of the
members fined were thirty-two dollars a week and the fines were ordercd to be paid
within seven days.
See also Rubens v. Weber, 237 App. Div. 15, 260 N.Y.S. 701 (1932) ($1000 fine by
musicians union imposed upon prominent member for violating minimum wage scale
upheld).
"8 Section 8 (b) (2) provides: "(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents- . . (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) ... or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic
dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership .... 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (2) (1964).
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labor practices. 09 Other union attempts to enforce fines, such as ter-
minating insurance plans or refusing to process grievances, have also
resulted in successful prosecution of unfair labor charges. 100
Recently, the unions have attempted to skirt problems of collec-
lection engendered by Taft-Hartley by instituting suits in state
courts on the theory that a member's obligations under a member-
ship contract enables the union to collect fines as a debt.101 This
approach has met with limited success, but some courts have re-
quired a bylaw provision stipulating collection procedures which
may be judicially enforced. 0 2 It would seem that only in such a
situation could the "membership contract" analogy be interposed
as apposite precedent for enforced collection. Enactment of a bylaw
which would characterize the fine as a contractual obligation might,
in situations other than a union shop context, 0 3 be an efficacious
method'of enforcement. However, other impediments to collection
on a debt theory may be forthcoming. If a union successfully sues
in a state court for a judgment and subsequently attempts to collect
by garnishing the employee's wages, this might provide a pretext
for the employer to discharge the worker as a bad debt risk. Such
action might lay both the union and the employer open to unfair
labor practice charges because functionally, this action could be
viewed as a union-induced discharge for failure to pay a union-
imposed obligation other than dues or initiation fees. 10 4
99 See, e.g., Journeymen Plasterers' Protective & Benevolent Soc'y v. NLRB, 341
F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1965) (unfair labor practice to demand reinstatement fee which in
fact was a guise to recover fine); NLRB v. National Automotive Fibres, Inc., 277
F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1960) (per curiam) (discharge of employee for failure to pay fines
constitutes an unfair labor practice); Pen & Pencil Workers Union, 91 N.L.R.B, 883
(1950) (unfair labor practice for union to coerce the discharge of a worker for failure
to pay union fine). As of 1961, however, eight union constitutions tied fines to dues
by stipulating that the payment of fines had to precede payment of dues. Another
eight union constitutions defined fines and assessments to mean dues. Dep't Labor Bull.
No. 1350, at 13.
1'°See, e.g., Local 479, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 151 N.L.R.B. No. 65, 58
L.R.R.M. 1439 (1965) (union committed unfair practice under § 8(b) (1) (A) by
threatefiing employees with loss of insurance benefits unless they paid fines for non-
attendance at meetings).
201 See, e.g., United Glass Workers v. Seitz, 65 Wash. 2d 619, 399 P.2d 74 (1965)
(collection denied-only provision in union bylaws for enforcing recovery of fine
was by- suspension); Local 756, UAW v. Woychik, 5 Wis. 2d 528, 93 N.W.2d 336
(1958) (collection of one dollar fines for failure to picket upheld by court); cf.
Buscaxllb v. Guglielmelli, 60 L.R.R.M. 2009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
"
2 See cases cited note 101 supra.
203 See notes 83-90 supra and accompanying text.
'"But see 58 L.R.R.M. 59-60 (1965), containing the NLRB General Counsel's
report which found no violation in a union's garnishment of wages to collect state
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(e) Alternatives to fining
A final consideration is whether specific disciplinary situations
present reasonable alternatives for the union which would make the
use of the fine unnecessary as a means of membership control. In
the context of the closed shop, expulsion was at one time considered
more severe than fining since it entailed the probable loss of job
and union benefits as well as the normal deprivation of social con-
tacts and friends.1 5 Presently, however, the expulsion power may be
only an illusory right in the hands of the union. It does remove the
member from meetings, but the union still must represent the
worker and, due to Taft-Hartley safeguards, cannot demand his dis-
charge. Moreover, it has been argued with some efficacy that there
is little social solidarity left in modem unionism. 06
Alternative means of discipline, such as refusing to provide ref-
erences for members or denying seniority rights, are often infirm
in that they may in themselves constitute independent violations
of section 8 (b) (1) (A).107 Fining is superior to these methods, for
with few exceptions08 it does not run afoul of the restrictions placed
on coercing employees to discriminate. At the same time, because
a fine is a measured form of discipline, it lends itself to written
presentation in specific bylaws. This characteristic makes it easier
for the union to overcome the problems of notice to the worker0 D
court judgment following a suit to collect a fine and a subsequent discharge of the
employee because of an employer policy against garnishments. This finding may be
limited by the facts for the employer was able to produce evidence that (1) other
attachments had been levied against the employee; (2) he had a poor record of at-
tendance; (3) the worker had been suspended once for insubordination and had given
false information on an employment form concerning a past arrest.
2
0
5 See Summers, Disciplinary Procedures of Unions, 4 IND. & LAB. REV. 15, 28 (1950).
106 see SULTAN, THE DISENCHANTED UNIONIST (1963), where the differences between
modem unionism and the past'are highlighted. "The contrast can be partially grasped
if one listens to the lyrics of union ballads, songs inspired by the struggles of the
thirties and earlier decades, but now a matter of historical curiosity for the coffee
house set . . . . The strike is no longer symbolized by beams and bricks . . . . The
table pounding and purple prose are giving way to the professional and his dry
statistics." Id. at vii-viii.
1 0TSee, e.g., NLRB v. Hod Carriers Union, 351 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1965) (union
violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by wrongfully refusing to refer union member); NLRB v.
Teamsters Union, Local 41, 225 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1955) (denial of seniority rights
cannot be utilized for disciplinary purposes); Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 139 N.L.R.B. 1169, 1174 (1962), afl'd, 328 F.2d 850 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 826 (1964) (union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by blacklisting employees who had
crossed picket line during a strike).
108 See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
109 See notes 91-93 supra and accompanying text.
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and at the same time sets forth standards which will aid a court
in reviewing possible abuses of regularized procedures.
PROBLEMS OF PREEMPTION AND PRIMARY JURISDICTION
A problem which is inherent in the context of judicial expansion
of section 8 (b) (1) (A) to cover union fining is that of assigning this
development a proper niche within the scheme of national labor
regulation. In San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon"0 the
Supreme Court held that
when an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [Taft-Hart-
ley] Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if
the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted."'
However, the Garmon Court also recognized that a state could
regulate an activity that was a merely "peripheral concern" of the
Taft-Hartley Act.12 The source of this "peripheral concern" ex-
ception was International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales," 3 where
the Court had allowed a state court to reinstate an expelled member
even though "wooden logic" would have required preemption under
Taft-Hartley." 4 The Court had reasoned in Gonzales that since
the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A) precluded a remedy through
federal law," 5 the union member would be without a remedy if the
state court were precluded from acting. 16 The potential conflict
with Taft-Hartley was thus considered to be too contingent and too
remote to justify preemption." 7
In 1959, union internal affairs were specifically regulated for
the first time by title I of the Landrum-Griffin Act." 8 This regu-
-10359 U.S. 236 (1959). The Court held that a state court was precluded by
preemption from awarding damages to employers under a state law for injuries
resulting from a picketing of their plant by a minority union.
M11 Id. at 245.
1 12 Id. at 243.
1X2 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
'
1 4 Id. at 619.
1 11 Id. at 620. The Court cited no cases supporting this proposition, stating that
"the protection of union members in their rights as members from arbitrary conduct
by unions and union officers has not been undertaken by federal law, and indeed
the assertion of any such power has been expressly denied." Ibid.
ILO Ibid.
117 Id. at 621.
11 3At the time of the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act, Congress apparently
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lation consisted of guaranteeing a narrow spectrum of rights closely
approximating the constitutional rights of free speech, equal pro-
tection and due process."19 The primary duty to enforce these pro-
visions was given to the federal district courts 20 while at the same
time, to avoid possible preemption problems,12  the states were
guaranteed concurrent jurisdiction. 22
The recent decision to review fines under section 8 (b) (1) (A)
raises both the problem of preemption under the Garmon rule
and the possibility of substantive overlap with the Landrum-Griffin
provisions. Arguably, under the strict Garmon rule, once fining
has been raised to the status of a "primary concern" all fining cases
must be reviewed in the first instance by the Board. 23 At the same
time, the pervasive regulation of internal union affairs possible un-
der an expanded version of section 8 (b) (1) (A) could include within
the Taft-Hartley Act's protection all of the Landrum-Griffin title I
thought that the Taft-Hartley Act could not deal with internal union disputes.
See 2 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE AaT
oF 1959, at 1667 (1959) containing statements of Representative McCormack that the
National Labor Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) did not purport to deal with internal
union disputes. The courts agreed. See, e.g., Parks v. International Bhd. of Electrical
Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 915 nA9 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963) (holding
that the Board has no power over intra-union relationships under § 7); Robertson v.
Banana Handlers Union, 183 F. Supp. 423, 426 (E.D. La. 1960) (statement that title I
of the Landrum-Griffin Act was the first federal law to protect workers against im-
proper disciplinary actions of unions). But see 2 LEGiSLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMNT REPORTING AND DiscLosurE ACT OF 1959, at 1108 (1959), where Senator
Kennedy argued against title I on the grounds that the rights were more satis-
factorily provided under state law and the existing Taft-Hartley provisions.
211 See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
220 See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
221 Senator Kennedy had raised the problem of preemption of state laws as a
major argument against title I. 2 LEGISLATAVvE H sToRY OF rHE LABOR-MANAGEMrENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOsUmE ACT OF 1959, at 1108 (1959).
122 Section 103 provides: "Nothing in this title shall limit the rights and remedies
of any member of a labor organization under any State or Federal law or before
any court or other tribunal, or under the constitution and bylaws of any labor or-
ganization." 73 Stat. 523 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
122 Many state courts relied on the "peripheral concern" exception as a basis for
asserting independent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Retail Clerks v. Christiansen, 67 Wash.
2d 29, 406 P.2d 327 (1965) (per curiam); Division 1478, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street
Employees v. Ross, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (61 L.R.R.M.) 2687 (March 8, 1966). But see
Local 248, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 11 Wis. 2d 277, 105 N.W.2d
271 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 878 (1961); Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v.
Lodge 78, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 11 Wis. 2d 292, 105 N.W.2d 278 (1960), cert.
denied, 365 U.S. 878 (1961). Both of the latter cases were decided on the basis that
Allen Bradley indicated that union fining might not be within the peripheral con-
cern exception to preemption.
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rights. 24 This result impedes the effectiveness of the jurisdictional
grant under the Landrum-Griffin Act.
At least in regard to those cases specifically covered by the
Landrum-Griffin provisions it seems reasonable to conclude that
Congress expressly precluded application of the preemption doc-
trine. Thus a suit alleging a violation of any right accorded under
the Landrum-Griffin Act is within the jurisdiction of both the federal
district courts and the state courts even though it might also over-
lap with a section 8 (b) (1) (A) proceeding before the NLRB.125 But
where a union fine does not give rise to a cause of action under the
Landrum-Griffin Act the Garmon rule would seem to demand that
both the state courts and the federal district courts yield to the pri-
mary jurisdiction of the Board. Under this approach a union fine
for drunkenness at a meeting, for political activity, or for other
off-the-job activities regulated by Landrum-Griffin 2 6 would be under
the concurrent jurisdiction of the NLRB, the federal courts and
the state courts, the latter of which already have expertise in the
area. Union fines which impinge on working conditions .such as
production quotas, fines for non-picketing, non-striking, or other
situations which could be called "terms and conditions of employ-
ment" 127 constitute areas which could proximately affect collective
124 Thus the effect is to come full circle in the protection of member's rights.
At the time of the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act the Board decision in
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727 (1954), seemed to indicate that
Taft-Hartley could not be used to protect workers thus necessitating the passage of
specific regulations.
However, as pointed out in note 27 supra, Landrum-Griffin has been criticized
because a plaintiff must provide his own counsel. The availability of a remedy under
the familiar Board procedures would redress the problem.
125 Cf. Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union Local 446, Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
320 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1963). The court broadly stated that Landrum-Gritfin was an
"explicit Congressional declaration . . . establish[ing] that the district court is com-
petent to retain jurisdiction of a Section 101 (a) (5) suit even when elements of the
case are arguably subject to the Board's jurisdiction." Id. at 275. The facts of the
case may limit the statement to dicta, however, for the plaintiff had unsuccessfully
filed charges with the Board prior to going to the district court. Id. at 273. Thus,
if the court had stated it was preempted, the member would have been remediless.
In fact, the court held that § 101 (a) (5) did not cover the plaintiff's disciplinary
situation.
120See notes 22-24 supra indicating the rights protected under the Landrum-
Griffin Act. The distinction between Landrum-Griffin and Taft-Hartley rights is
dependent upon the interpretation given to Landrum-Griffin by the courts. At present
the emerging case law indicates that the protection granted to members under title
I has been narrowly construed. See, e.g., Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964);
Comment, 13 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 335 (1966).
27 In effect, although the terminology *'terms and conditions of employment" is
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bargaining peace and thus should be subject to uniformity of scrut-
iny and decision. Such fines should thus fall within the exclusive
domain of the Board.
Conclusion
The cases illustrate that the Taft-Hartley Act has expanded its
area of concern into the problem of union discipline. Spurred by
the passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act, the Board and the reviewing
courts have discovered that the effectuation of national labor policies
make requisite that union members be afforded greater protection
against arbitrary action. The courts and to a lesser extent the Board
have evinced an increasing unwillingness to bestow carte blanche
powers of discipline upon the unions, reasoning that a union-mem-
ber relationship should rest upon consent rather than coercion.
Whereas coercion was previously defined to include only the most
blatant cases of violence and coerced employer discrimination,
there seems to be a discernable progression toward limiting the
lesser forms of discipline such as fining.
It appears that section 8 (b) (1) (A) may be wielded as an espe-
cially effective tool in the regulation of union fining if its permissive
proviso, which has previously shielded fines which were in accordance
with union bylaws, is given a narrow interpretation. Once im-
munity under the proviso is vitiated in a given situation, the best
approach to the resolution of fining issues appears to be a case-by-
case assessment of peculiarly relevant factors, avoiding broad policy
decisions until more expertise in the area of fining is gained.
borrowed from Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. NLRB,
352 F.2d 745, 750 (9th Cir. 1965), where it was applied in a § 8 (b) (1) (A) sense, the test
would approximate that already in existence in the preemption field under Local
100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 697 (1963); Local 207, Int'l
Ass'n of Bridge Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963). The ruling on that case
was to the effect that Taft-Hartley preemption should apply when the "crux" of the
suit involved the worker's employment relations. For a recent application of this test
by a state court, see Directors Guild of America, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 48 Cal. Rptr. 710,
409 P.2d 934 (1966), where the state court ruled that it was without jurisdiction to
hear a similar case.
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